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Preface Introduction Part I Legal Reasoning and Practical Rationality Chapter 1 - Practical Rationality 1.1. Implicit Cognition 1.1.1. Fixed Reflexes 1.1.2. Conditioned Reflexes 1.2. Explicit Cognition 1.2.1. Cognitive Functions and Cognitive Organs 1.2.2. Reason As a Mental Organ 1.2.3. Epistemic Reasoning 1.2.4. Practical Reasoning 1.2.5. The Foundations of Rationality 1.3. The Nature of Practical Cognition 1.3.1. Basic Conative States 1.3.2. Adoption and Withdrawal of Conative States 1.3.3. Abstract Plans and Subplanning 1.3.4. The Structure of Plans 1.3.5. The Evaktation of Plans 1.3.6. Epistemic Desires: Knowledge and Interest 1.3.7. Strategies, Standing Plans, and Instructions 1.4. The Function of Intentions 1.4.1. Intentions and Instructions 1.4.2. Reasoning with Intentions 1.4.3. Behavioural and Cognitive Instructions 1.4.4. Other-Directed Intentions and Commands 1.4.5. General and Collective Intentions 1.4.6. May-Instructions and Intentions 1.5. Reasoning and Cognition 1.5.1. Failures of Reasoning 1.5.2. Reasoning's Dependency on Implicit Cognition 1.5.3. Reasoning's Contribution to Cognition Chapter 2- Basic Forms of Reasoning 2.1. Ratiocination 2.1.1. Mental States, Noemata, Sentences, and Speech Acts 2.1.2. Reasoning Schemata and Instances 2.1.3. The Adoption of a Reasoning Schema 2.2. Conclusive and Defeasible Reasoning 2.2.1. Validity and Truth.Preservation 2.2.2. Monotonic and Nonmononic Reas~ning 2.2.3. The Rationale of Defeasibility 2.2.4. The Logical Function of Defeasible Reasoning Schemata 2.2.5. Collision and Defeat 2.2.6. Collisions and Incompatibility 2.2.7. Undercutting Collisions 2.2.8. Preference-Based Reasoning 2.2.9. Reinstatement 2.2.10. Undercutting in Practical Reasoning 2.2.11. Defeasible Reasoning and Probability 2.3. Some Notes on Defeasibility in Law and Morality 2.3.1. The Idea of Defeasibility in the Practical Domain 2.3.2. Defeasibility in Legal Language 2.3.3. The Defeasibility of Legal Concepts and Principles 2.3.4. Defeasibility and Legal Procedures 2.3.5. Overcoming Legal Defeasibility? 2.4. Heuresis and Coherence Evaluation 2.4.1. The Construction of Conjectures 2.4.2. Functions of Heuresis 2.4.3. Heuresis and Ratiocination: An Overview Chapter 3- The Doxification of Practical Reasoning 3.1. Doxification 3.1.1. Adoption-Worthiness and Bindingness 3.1.2. The Notion of Doxification 3.1.3. The Rationale for Doxification 3.1.4. The Doxification of Conative States 3.1.5. The Idea of Cognitwe Bindingness 3.1.6. The Doxfication of Cognitive Instructions 3.2. The Projection of Practical Beliefs 3.2.1. Doxified Shall-b~tentions 3.2.2. Doxifying May-Intentions 3.3. Normative Beliefs and Normative States of Affairs 3.3.1. Normative States of Affairs and Current Cognitive States 3.3.2. Normative States of Affairs and Optimal Cognitive States 3.3.3. Cognitive Optimality and Collective Inquiry 3.3.4. Cognitive Optimality and Dialogues 3.3.5. The Supervenience of Normative States of Affairs 3.3.6. The Relativisation of Practical Cognition 3.3.7. Practical Cognition and the Existence of Normative States of Affairs Chapter 4- Rationalisation, Reflexivity, Universality 4.1. Rationalisation 4.1. I. Upwards Practical Reasoning 4.1.2. Rationalisation and Critical Thinking 4.1.3. Rationalisation in Legal Reasoning 4.1.4. Practical Theories and Their Coherence 4.2. Reflexive Reasoning and Universality 4.2.1. Planar and Reflexive Reasoning 4.2.2. Reasoning and Meta-Reasoning 4.2.3. Descriptive and Ideal Rationality 4.2.4. Particularised and Universal Rationality 4.2.5. Limits of Rationality 4.3. An Example in Practical Reasoning 4.3.1. Creon's Reasoning 4.3.2. Antigone's Reasoning 4.3.3. Comparison of the Two Reasonings Chapter 5- Bounded Rationality: Cognitive Delegation 5.1. The Notion of Bounded Rationality 5.1.1. The Limitations of Human Rationality 5.1.2. Substantive and Procedural Rationality 5.2. Bounded Rationality and Teleology 5.2. I. Failure to Achieve Teleological Optimality 5.2.2. The Evaluation of Outcomes 5.2.3. Pareto Efficieno, 5.2.4. Weighing Alternatives 5.2.5. Simplifying Evaktations 5.3. Cognitive Delegation and Authority 5.3.1. The Concept of Delegation 5.3.2. Types of Cognitive Delegation 5.3.3. Authority and Normative Powwer 5.3.4. Rules and Teleology 5.3.5. The Notion of an Exclusionary Reason 5.3.6. Exclusionary Reasons and Normative Delegation 5.3.7. Authorities as Exclusionary or" Independent Reasons 5.3.8. Commands and Reasons 5.3.9. The Independence of Normative Sy llogism from Teleo- logical Reasoning Chapter 6- Bounded Rationality: Factors 6.1. Propensities 6.1.1. Propensities and Intentions 6.1.2. Factors and Teleology 6.1.3. Logical Function of Propensities 6.2. Factors 6.2.1. Binary Factors and Dimensions 6.2.2. Factors and Principles 6.2.3. Factors, Dimensions and Standards 6.2.4. Factors in Legislation 6.2.5. Factors in Case-Based Reasoning 6.2.6. The Role of Factors in Practical Inference 6.2.7. Factors, Dimensions, and Prototypes Chapter 7 - Preference-Based Reasoning: Rules 7.1. Rules and Preferences 7.1.1. Undecided Conflicts 7.1.2. Priority Beliefs 7.2. Kinds of Rule Preferences 7.2.1. Source-Based Priority 7.2.2. Time-Based Priority 7.2.3. Specificity-Based Priority 7.2.4. Checking Specificity 7.2.5. Priority of Exceptions 7.2.6. Value-Based Priorities 7.2.7. Factor:Based Priorities 7.3. Reasoning with Rule-Priorities 7.3.1. Multiple Priorities and Their Ordering 7.3.2. General Priority-Rules ' 7.3.3. Meta-Priorities 7.3.4. Reasoning with Priorities and Belief Revision Chapter 8 - Preference-Based Reasoning: Factors 8.1. Reasoning with Factors 8.1.1. An Example in Factor-Based Reasoning 8.1.2. Factor-Based A-Fortiori Reasoning 8.1.3. Factor-Based Inference 8.1.4. From Binary Factors to Dimensions 8.1.5. Dimension-Based Inference 8.1.6. Dimensional A-Fortiori Reasoning 8.2. The Accrual of Reasons 8.2.1. The Accrual Thesis 8.2.2. The Negation of the Accrual Thesis 8.2.3. A Terminological Clarification 8.2.4. Merging and Adding Reasons Chapter 9- Multi-Agent Practical Reasoning 9.1. The Concerns of an Agent 9.1.1. Three Types of Concerns 9.1.2. The Construction of Collective- Directed Concerns 9.1.3. Reasoning and Collective-Directed Concerns 9.2. Acting in a Social Context 9.2.1. External Motivation and Threats 9.2.2. Double Contingency 9.3. Strategic Dilemmas 9.3.1. Prisoner's dilemmas 9.3.2. Prisoner-Dilemma Structured Situations 9.3.3. The Tragedy of the Commons 9.3.4. Strategic Dilemmas and Collective Concerns 9.3.5. Coordination Dilemmas 9.3.6. Salience 9.3.7. Assurance Dilemmas Chapter 10- Collective Intentionality 10.1. Coordination and Collective Intentionality 10.1. I. Collective Cognitive States I0.1.2. Collective Rationality and Collective Cognitive States 10.1.3. Rational Adoption of a Collective Cognitive State 10.1.4. Collective and Plural Optimality 10.1.5. The Gamble of Participation 10.2. Participation as a Coordination Game 10.2.1. Salience as a Guide to Success I0.2.2. Rational Participation and Consent 10.2.3. Rational Participation in a Future Collective State of Mind 10.2.4. The Intrinsic Value of Participation 10.2.5. The Process of Collective Reasoning 10.2.6. Collective Practical Theories 10.2.7. Collective Adoption of Multi-Agent Plans 10 2.8. Collective Adoption of Acceptance Policies 10. 2.9. Collective Normative Beliefs 10.3. Sanctions and Assurance 10.3.1. The Possibility of Non- Compliance 10.3.2. The Role of Sanctions 10.4. Plural Legal Intentionality 10.4.1. Collective Reasoning and Authoritarianism 10.4.2. Collective Values Chapter 11 - Collective Cognition and Dialogues 11.1. Dialogues and Cognition 11.1.1. Dialogues and Dialectical Systems 11.1.2. How to Characterise Dialectical Sy stems 11.1.3. The Structure of Dialectical Systems 11.1.4. The Persuasion Dialogue. The Structure 11.1.5. The Persuasion Dialogue. The Position of the Parties 1 I. 1.6. Other Kinds of Dialogue: Information Seeking, Nego- tiation, and Reconciliation 11. I. 7. Combination of Dialogues, Dialogue Shifts, and Inver- sion of the Burden of Proof 11.2. Dialogues and Procedures 11.2.1. What Dialogues for What Procedures 11.2.2. Dialogue and Collective Choices 11.2.3. Deliberation, Democracy and Cognition 11.2.4. Adversarial Models of Legal Argumentation 11.2.5. Formal Analyses of Legal Disputation Chapter 12 - Cognitive and Legal Bindingness 12 .1 The Paradox of Legal Validity 12.2. A Legal Example 12.2.1. Prima-Facie Reasoning 12.2.2. The Adoption (Endorsement) of a Legal Rule I2.2.3. Substantive Adoption Policies 12.3. Validit y Bindingness, Adoptability 12.3.1. The Social Impact of Legal Reasoning 12.3.2. Legal Reasoning as a Contribution to the Legal Process 12.3.3. Participation in Legal Beliefs 12.3.4. Reasoning about Legal Bindingness 12.4. Bindingness and Rationality 12.4.1. Convergence as a Ground for Bindingness 12.4.2. Why Share Legal Rules and Meta- Rules 12.4.3. Participation in Currently Shared Rules I2.4.4. Participation in Future Rules 12.4.5. Coordination and Prioritisation Chapter 13 - The Foundation of Legal Bindingness 13.1. Definitional and Substantive Issues 13.1.1. Definitions of Legal Bindingness 13.1.2. Grounds for Bindingness 13.1.3. Terminological Disputes and Substantive Disagree- ment: The Stance of the Enactment Positivist 13.1.4. Terminological Disputes and Substantive Disagree- ment: The Stance of the Practice Positivist 13.1.5. Terminological Disputes and Substantive Disagree- ment: The Stance of the Inclusive Positivist 13.1.6. The Normativity of Legal Bindingness (Validity) 13.2. Political Conflicts and Legal Bindingness I3.2.1. Legal Bindingness and Optimal Law 13.2.2. Unacceptability on Substantive Grounds 13.2.3. Constitutions and Constitutionalism I3.2.4. Law, Power, Sovereignty 13.2.5. Legal Bindingness and Moral Bindingness 13.2.6. Bindingness Propositions 13.2.7. Legal Reasoning and Detachment I3.2.8. Legal Reasoning and Shared Legal Opinions 13.2.9. Overcoming the Paradox of Legal Validity Part II Legal Logic Chapter 14- Law and Logic 14.1. Introduction: Logic and Legal Reasoning 14.1.1. The Attraction between Law and Logic 14.1.2. The Conflict between Law and Logic 14.2. Deduction and Formal Logic in Legal Reasoning 14.2.1. The Deductive Model of Legal Reasoning 14.2.2. Deduction and Anticipation I4.2.3. The Tension between Legal Logic and Legal Practice 14.2.4. The Anti-Deductive Critiques 14.2.5. Defences of the Axiomatic-Deductive Model 14.2.6. Legal Logic Beyond Deduction Chapter 15 - Classical Logic and the Law 15.1. Propositional Logic 15.1.1. Propositional Formalisation 15.1.2. Propositional Connectives 15.1.3. Normalisation 15.1.4. Inference Rules for Propositional Logic 15.2. The Application of Propositional Logic to the Law 15.2.1. Material Conditional and Hypothetical Propositions 15.2.2. Ex Falso Sequitur Quodlibet inLegal Reasoning 15.2.3. Logical Inference and Truth- Preservation 15.3. Predicate Logic and the Law 15.3.1. Predicates and Terms I5.3.2. Quantifiers 15.3.3. Inference Rules for Predicate Logic 15.3.4. Normative Syllogism 15.4. Time in Predicate Logic 15.4.1. Propositions and Fluents 15.4.2. From Fluents to Propositions 15.4.3. Representing Temporally-General Rules 15.5. Conclusions on Predicate Logic in the Law Chapter 16- Actions 16.1. The Characterisation of Actions 16.2. Logical Analysis of Action 16.2.1. Two Action-Operators 16.2.2. The Logic of Action 16.2.3. Actions-Descriptions as Propositions and as Terms 16.2.4. Connections Between Behavioural and Productive A tions 16.3. Omission 16.3.1. The Notion of an Omission 16.3.2. Logical Analysis of Omission 16.3.3. Some Abbreviations for Representing Actions Chapter 17 - Deontic Notions 17.1. Obligation 17.1. I. The Representation of Obligations 17.1.2. Positive and Negative Obligations 17.2. Prohibition 17.2. I. The Representation of Prohibitions I7.2.2. Connections between Obligation and Prohibition 17.3. .Permission 17.3.1. The Representation of Permissions 17.3.2. Positive and Negative Permission I7.3.3. Connections between Obligations, Prohibitions, and Permissions 17.3.4. A Fourth Deontic Status: Facultativeness 17.3.5. Commands and Deontic Statuses 17.4. An Axiomatisation for Deontic Reasoning 17.4.1. Relationships between Obligations and Permissions I7.4.2. Reasoning Schemata for Action Logic and Deontic Logic 17.5. Negative Corollaries on Permission 17.5.1. Permission Does Not Entail Facultativeness 17.5.2. Permission Does not Entail Prohibition to Prevent 17.5.3. Permission Does Not Presuppose Prohibition 17.6. General Deontic Propositions 17.6.1. The Representation of Categorical Deontic Proposi- tions 17.6.2. Personally-General and Specific Deontic Propositions 17.7. Standard Deontic Logic and Deontic Paradoxes 17.7.1. Standard Deontic Logic 17.7.2. Paradoxes of Standard Deontic Logic 17.7.3. How to Avoid Deontic Paradoxes Chapter 18 - Negation, Permission, and Completeness 18.1. Permission, Ignorance, Non-Derivability 18.1.1. Being Permitted and Not Being Prohibited 18.1.2. Permission as Ignorance I8.1.3. The Case of Socrates, the Judge Who Knows T/sat He Does not Know 18.1.4. Permission as Non-Derivability 18.2. Completeness of the Law 18.2.1. The Completeness of Legal Cognition: A Noble Dream ? I8.2.2. Completeness of Sections of the Law I8.2.3. Closure Meta-Rules 18.2.4. Strong Permission and Weak Permission 18.2.5. Closure Rules and Bounded Legal Cognition 18.2.6. Ignorance and A utoepistemic Inferences 18.2.7. Some Conclusions on Negation, Permission, and Com- pleteness Chapter 19- Obligational Concepts 19.1. Teleology of Normative Propositions 19.1.1. The Teleological Stance toward Normative Proposi- tions 19.1.2. A Notation for Normative Teleology 19.2. Directed Obligations 19.2.1. Other-Directed Obligations 19.2.2. The Representation of Other:Directed Obligations 19.2.3. Other-Directed Permissions 19.2.4. Reasoning with Directed Obligations 19.3. Obligational Rights 19.3.1. Representation of Obligational Rights 19.3.2. The Benefit Theory of Rights 19.4. A Formalisation the Hohfeldian Obligational Set I9.4. I. The Hohfeldian Obligational Set: Original Formula- tion 19.4.2. The Hohfeldian Obligational Set: Logical Reformula- tion 19.5. Further Kinds of Rights 19.5.1. Permissive Rights 19.5.2. Absolute and Relative Rights 19.5.3. Exclusionary Rights 19.6. Rights and Norms 19.6.1. Rights in Authoritarian Legal Systems 19.6.2. The Supposed Conflict between Rights and "Norms" Chapter 20- Normative Conditionals and Legal Inference 20.1. The Cognitive Function of Normative Conditionals 20.1.1. Conditional Instructions and Propositions 20.1.2. Kinds of Normatwe Conditionals 20.2. Specific and General Normative Conditionals 20.2. I. Specific Normative Conditionals 20.2.2. Normative Conditionals and Causality 20.2.3. General Normative Conditionals 20.2.4. Operative Facts, Precondition-Types and Tokens 20.2.5. Must and Relative Necessity 20.3. The Negation of Normative Conditionals 20.4. Inferences for Normative Conditionals 20.4.1. Detachment 20.4.2. Specification and Universal Conditionals 20.4.3. Normative Syllogism 20.4.4. Chaining Syllogisms 20.4.5. Syllogism and Subsumption 20.4.6. Subsumption Rules 20.4.7. Subsumption and Learning 20.5. Inapplicable Inferences 20.5.1. Inferring a Conditional from a Falsity 20.5.2. Normatwe Conditionals and Contraposition Chapter 21 - Varieties of Normative Conditionals 21.1. Types of Normative Conditionals 21.1. I. Different Kinds of Normative Determination 21.1.2. Counts-as Connections and Constitutive Rules 21.2. Intermediate Legal Concepts 21.2.1. Alf Ross's Theory of Legal Concepts 21.2.2. The Inferential Meaning of Intermediate Legal Con- cepts 21.2.3. Cognitive Function of Non-Deontic Legal Concepts 21.3. Kelsen's View of Legal Conditionality 21.3.1. Causality and Imputation 21.3.2. Problems with the Kelsenian Conditionality 21.4. Normative Conditionals and Time 21.4.1. Temporal Predicates 21.4.2. Temporally Specific Normative Initiation 21.4.3. Temporal Generality and Normative Initiation 21.4.4. Temporal Persistence 21.4.5. Temporalised Normative Syllogism 21.4.6. Time and Normative Emergence 21.4.7. Temporalised Counts-As Chapter 22 - Potestative Concepts 22.1. Powers and Potestative Rights 22.1.1. Generic Power 22.1.2. Action-Power 22.1.3. Abstract Action-Power 22.1.4. Enabling Power 22.1.5. Potestative Right 22.1.6. Powers and Permissions 22.2. A Formalisation of the Hohfeldian Potestative Set 22.2.1. The Hohfeldian Potestative Set: Original Formulation 22.2.2. The Hohfeldian Potestative Set: Logical Reformulation Chapter 23 - Proclamations 23.1. The Intentional Production of Legal Results 23.1. I. Rechtsgeschaft and Contract 23.1.2. Contracts and Autonomy 23.2. The Notion of a Proclamation 23.2. I. The Definition of a Proclamation 23.2.2. Proclamations and Intentions 23.2.3. Proclamations as Attempts 23.2.4. Proclamation Rules 23.3. The Logic of Proclamation-Based Inference 23.3.1. The Naive Formulation 23.3.2. The Problem of Substitutional Quantification 23.3.3. How to Climb Ramsev's Ladder 23.3.4. Our Representation of Meta- Syllogism 23.4. The Analysis of Proclamations 23.4.1. The Content of Proclamations 23.4.2. Effective and Void Proclamations 23.4.3. Multi-lateral Proclamations (Agreements) 23.4.4. The Logic of Proclamations Chapter 24 - Proclamative Power 24.1. The Notion and the Inferential Role of Proclamative Powers 24.1.1. Proclamatwe Power and Legal Inference 24.1.2. Proclamative Power and General Inferences 24.2. Kinds of Proclamative Power 24.2.1. The Power to Create and Terminate Obligations 24.2.2. The Power to Confer Permissions 24.2.3. Empowerment to Command 24.2.4. Empowerment to Renounce a Power 24.2.5. Power to Transfer Property 24.3. Empowerment to Empower 24.3.1. Conferring Powers 24.3.2. Representation 24.3.3. Limitations to Individual Legal Autonomy 24.4. Public Powers as Proclamative Powers 24.4.1. Proclamations and the Dynamics of the Law 24.4.2. Legal Dynamics and the Applicability of Logic to the Law 24.4.3. Judicial Powers and Logic in the Law Chapter 25 - Normative Texts and Sources of Law 25.1. Proclamations and Their Interpretation 25.1,1. The Efficacy of Proclamations 25.1,2. The Double Effect of Proclamations 25.1,3. Proclaimed Sentences 25.1,4. The Bindingness of Proclaimed Sentences 25.1,5. The Interpretation of Proclamations 25.1,6. Problems in Legal Interpretation 25.1,7. Criteria for Interpretation 25.2. Sources of Law 25.2,1. Custom 25.2.2. Precedent 25.2.3. Legal Doctrine as a Source of the Law 25.2.4. The General Idea of a Source of Law 25.3. A Logic for Legal Pluralism 25.3.1. The Need for a Pluralist Legal Logic 25.3.2. An Example in Pluralist Normative Reasoning 25.3.3. An Analysis of Pluralist Normative Reasoning Chapter 26 - Argumentation Frameworks 26.1. From Inference Steps to Arguments 26.1.1. The Notion of an Argument 26.1.2. Some Notational Devices 26.1.3. The Lebach Example 26.1.4. Arguments and Premise Sets 26.i,5. Subarguments 26.2. Meta-Level Arguments 26.2.1. A Meta-Level Argument 26.2.2. Synthetic and Analytic Arguments 26.2.3. Another Meta-Level Argument 26.3. Collisions between Arguments 26.3.1. The Idea of a Collision between Arguments 26.3.2. Rebutting Collisions 26.3.3. Undercutting Collisions 26.3.4. Locating Undercutting Attacks 26.4. Argument Defeat 26.4. I, The Notion of Argument Defeat 26.4.2. Decisive Subreasons and the Evatiation of Colliding Reasons 26.4.3. The Preference Relation over Reasons 26.4.4. The Reinstatement ofDefeated Arguments Chapter 27 - Argument Logic 27.1. The Status of Arguments 27.1.1. Requirements of an Argument Logic 27.1.2. Justified, Defensible, and Overruled Arguments 27.1.3. Semantics and Proof Theory 27.2. The Semantics of Inferential Justifiability 27.2.1. Prima-facie defeat 27.2.2. Acceptability of Arguments 27.2.3. Admissibility of Sets of Arguments 27.2.4. Justified Arguments 27.2.5. A Formal Characterisation of lnferential Justifiability 27.3. A Proof-Theory for Inferential Justifiability 27.3.1. Proof Trees 27.3.2. The Proof of an Argument 27.3.3. Applications of the Proof-Method 27.3.4. Ross's Paradox of the Self-Amending Constitution 27.3.5. A Solution to the Self-Amendment Paradox: Non- Retroactivity 27.3.6. A Second Solution to the Self- Amendment Paradox: An Interpretative Assumption 27.4. Extensions of the Basic Model 27.4.1. Representing Non-Provability 27.4.2. Non-Provability and Burden of Proof 27.4.3. Combining Defeasible and Conclusive Inferences Chapter 28 - Cases and Theory Construction 28.1. Case-Based Reasoning as Theory Construction 28.1.1. Cases and Theories 28.1.2. Levels of Explanation and Justification 28.2. The Construction of a Theory 28.2.1. The Example 28.2.2. The Background of Theory Construction 28.2.3. The Components of a Theory 28.2.4. Including Cases and Factors 28.2.5. Constructing Rules 28.2.6. Constructing Preferences Chapter 29 - Theory-Based Dialectics 29.1. The Basic Model 29.1.1. Constructing Theories and Explaining Cases 29.1.2. A Simple Theory 29.1.3. The Introduction of a New Case 29.1.4. Theory-Based Distinguishing 29.1.5. Arbitrary and Value-Based Preferences 29.1.6. Evaluating Theories 29.2. Argument Moves and Theory Construction 29.2.1. Citing a Case 29.2.2. Counterexamples and Distinctions 29.2.3. Emphasising Strengths and Showing Weaknesses not Fatal 29.3. Dimensions in Theory Constructions 29.3.1. Dimensions and the Representation of Cases 29.3.2. Dimensions and Values 29.3.3. The Extraction of Factors 29.3.4. Additional Reasoning Moves 29.4. Stratified Legal Theories 29.4.1. Hierarchies of Factors 29.4.2. Downplaying a Distinction 29.4.3. Distinguishing, Downplaying, and Distinguishing Again 29.5. Further Extensions of Our Model 29.5.1. Metrics for Theory Coherence 29.5.2. Comparison of Values 29.5.3. Changes in the Social Context 29.5.4. Links to Case-History 29.5.5. Other Ways of Analogising Conclusion Bibliography Index of Subjects Index of Names |
