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  • 书名:CONTRACT THEORY
  • 作者:PATRICK BOLTON AND MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT
  • 出版:The MIT Press Cambridge,Massachusetts London England
  • 年月:
  • 页数:724
  • 书价:
  • 登录号:NE00014
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  图书目录:Preface

         Introduction

         1.1   Optimal Employment Contracts without Uncertainty, Hidden

                 Information, or Hidden Actions

         1.2   Optimal Contracts under Uncertainty

                 11.2,1   Pure Insurance

                 1.2.2   Optimal Employment Contracts under Uncertainty

         1.3   Information and Incentives

                 1.3.1   Adverse Selection

                 1,3.2   Moral Hazard

         1.4   Optimal Contracting with Multilateral Asymmetric

                 Information

                 1.4.1   Auctions and Trade under Multilateral Private

                           Information

                 1.4.2   Moral Hazard in Teams, Tournaments, and

                           Organizations

         1.5   The Dynamics of Incentive Contracting

                 1.5.1   Dynamic Adverse Selection

                 1.5.2   Dynamic Moral Hazard

         1.6   Incomplete Contracts

                 1.6.1   Ownership and Employment

                 1.6.2   Incomplete Contracts and Implementation Theory

                 1.6.3   Bilateral Contracts and Multilateral Exchange

         1.7   Summing Up

Part I  STATIC BILATERAL CONTRACTING

         Hidden Information, Screening

         2.1   The Simple Economics of Adverse Selection

                 2.1.1   First-Best Outcome: Perfect Price Discrimination

                 2.1.2   Adverse Selection, Linear Pricing, and Simple

                           Two-Part Tariffs

                 2.1.3   Second-Best Outcome: Optimal Nonlinear Pricing

         2.2   Applications

                 2.2.1   Credit Rationing

                 2.2.2   Optimal Income Taxation

                 2.2.3   Implicit Labor Contracts

                 2.2.4   Regulation

         2.3   More Than Two Types

                 2.3.1   Finite Number of Types

                 2.3.2   Random Contracts

                 2.3.3   A Continuum of Types

          2.4   Summary

          2.5   Literature Notes

3      Hidden Information, Signaling

          3.1   Spence's Model of Education as a Signal

                 3.1.1   Refinements

          3.2   Applications

                 3.2.1   Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions

                           under Asymmetric Information

                 3.2.2   Signaling Changes in Cash Flow through Dividend

                           Payments

          3.3   Summary and Literature Notes

4      Hidden Action, Moral Hazard

          4.1   Two Performance Outcomes

                 4.1.1   First-Best versus Second-Best Contracts

                 4.1.2   The Second Best with Bilateral Risk Neutrality and

                           Resource Constraints for the Agent

                 4.1.3   Simple Applications

                 4.1.4   Bilateral Risk Aversion

                 4.1.5   The Value of Information

          4.2   Linear Contracts, Normally Distributed Performance, and

                 Exponential Utility

          4.3   The Suboptimality of Linear Contracts in the Classical

                 Model

          4.4   General Case: The First-Order Approach

                 4.4.1   Characterizing the Second Best

                 4.4.2   When is the First-Order Approach Valid?

          4.5   Grossman and Hart's Approach to the Principal-Agent

                 Problem

          4.6   Applications

       4.6.1   Managerial Incentive Schemes

       4.6.2   The Optimality of Debt Financing under Moral

                 Hazard and Limited Liability

4.7   Summary

4.8   Literature Notes

Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information

5.1   Voluntary Disclosure of Verifiable Information

        5.1.1   Private, Uncertifiable Information

        5.1.2   Private, Certifiable Information

        5.1.3   Too Much Disclosure

        5.1.4   Unraveling and the Full Disclosure Theorem

        5.1.5   Generalizing the Full Disclosure Theorem

5.2   Voluntary Nondisclosure and Mandatory-Disclosure Laws

        5.2.1   Two Examples of No Disclosure or Partial

                  Voluntary Disclosure

        5.2.2   Incentives for Information Acquisition and the

                  Role of Mandatory-Disclosure Laws

        5.2.3   No Voluntary Disclosure When the Informed

                  Party Can Be Either a Buyer or a Seller

 5.3   Costly Disclosure and Debt Financing

 5.4   Summary and Literature Notes

 Multidimensional Incentive Problems

 6.1   Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Types

         6.1.1   An Example Where Bundling Is Profitable

         6.1.2   When Is Bundling Optimal? A Local Analysis

         6.1.3   Optimal Bundling: A Global Analysis in the 2 x 2

                  Model

         6.1.4   Global Analysis for the General Model

 6.2   Moral Hazard with Multiple Tasks

         6.2.1   Multiple Tasks and Effort Substitution

         6.2.2   Conflicting Tasks and Advocacy

 6.3   An Example Combining Moral Hazard and Adverse

         Selection

         6.3.1   Optimal Contract with Moral Hazard Only

         6.3.2   Optimal Contract with Adverse Selection Only

                 6.3.3   Optimal Sales with Both Adverse Selection and

                           Moral Hazard

          6.4   Summary and Literature Notes

Part II STATIC MULTILATERAL CONTRACTING

7      Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and

          Auctions

          7.1   Introduction

          7.2   Bilateral Trading

                 7.2.1   The Two-Type Case

                 7.2.2   Continuum of Types

          7.3   Auctions with Perfectly Known Values

                 7.3.1   Optimal Efficient Auctions with Independent Values

                 7.3.2   Optimal Auctions with Independent Values

                 7.3.3   Standard Auctions with Independent Values

                 7.3.4   Optimal Independent-Value Auctions with a

                           Continuum of Types: The Revenue Equivalence

                           Theorem

                 7.3.5   Optimal Auctions with Correlated Values

                 7.3.6   The Role of Risk Aversion

                 7.3.7   The Role of Asymmetrically Distributed Valuations

          7.4   Auctions with Imperfectly Known Common Values

                 7.4.1   The Winner's Curse

                 7.4.2   Standard Auctions with Imperfectly Known

                           Common Values in the 2 x 2 Model

                 7.4.3   Optimal Auctions with Imperfectly Known

                           Common Values

          7.5   Summary

          7.6   Literature Notes

          7.7   Appendix: Breakdown of Revenue Equivalence in a 2 x 3

                 Example

          Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion

          8.1   Moral Hazard in Teams and Tournaments

                 8.1.1   Unobservable Individual Outputs: The Need for a

                           Budget Breaker

                  8.1.2   Unobservable Individual Outputs: Using Output

                            Observations to Implement the First Best

                  8.1.3   Observable Individual Outputs

                  8.1.4   Tournaments

          8.2   Cooperation or Competition among Agents

                  8.2.1   Incentives to Help in Multiagent Situations

                  8.2.2   Cooperation and Collusion among Agents

          8.3   Supervision and Collusion

                  8.3.1   Collusion with Hard Information

                  8.3.2   Application: Auditing

          8.4   Hierarchies

          8.5   Summary

          8.6   Literature Notes

Part III REPEATED BILATERAL CONTRACTING

          Dynamic Adverse Selection

          9.1   Dynamic Adverse Selection with Fixed Types

                  9.1.1   Coasian Dynamics

                  9.1.2   Insurance and Renegotiation

                  9.1.3   Soft Budget Constraints

                 9.1.4   Regulation

          9.2   Repeated Adverse Selection: Changing Types

                 9.2.1   Banking and Liquidity Transformation

                 9.2.2   Optimal Contracting with Two Independent

                           Shocks

                 9.2.3   Second-Best Risk Sharing between Infinitely

                           Lived Agents

          9.3   Summary and Literature Notes

10     Dynamic Moral Hazard

          10.1  The Two-Period Problem

                 10.1.1  No Access to Credit

                 10.1.2  Monitored Savings

                 10.1.3  Free Savings and Asymmetric Information

         10.2  The T-period Problem: Simple Contracts and the Gains

                 from Enduring Relations

                 10.2.1  Repeated Output

                 10.2.2  Repeated Actions

                 10.2.3  Repeated Actions and Output

                 10.2.4  Infinitely Repeated Actions, Output, and

                           Consumption

          10.3  Moral Hazard and Renegotiation

                 10.3.1  Renegotiation When Effort Is Not Observed by

                           the Principal

                 10.3.2  Renegotiation When Effort Is Observed by the

                           Principal

          10.4  Bilateral Relational Contracts

                 10.4.1  Moral Hazard

                 10.4.2  Adverse Selection

                 10.4.3  Extensions

          10.5  Implicit Incentives and Career Concerns

                 10.5.1  The Single-Task Case

                 10.5.2  The Multitask Case

                 10.5.3  The Trade-Off between Talent Risk and Incentives

                           under Career Concerns

          10.6  Summary

          10.7  Literature Notes

Part IV INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS

11     Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design

          11.1  Introduction: Incomplete Contracts and the Employment

                 Relation

                 11.1.1  The Employment Relation

                 11.1.2  A Theory of the Employment Relation Based on

                           Ex Post Opportunism

          11.2  Ownership and the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm

                 11.2.1  A General Framework with Complementary

                           Investments

                 11.2.2  A Framework with Substitutable Investments

          11.3  Financial Structure and Control

                 11.3.1  Wealth Constraints and Contingent Allocations of

                           Control

                 11.3.2  Wealth Constraints and Optimal Debt Contracts

                           when Entrepreneurs Can Divert Cash Flow

          11.4  Summary

          11.5  Literature Notes

12     Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information

          12.1  Introduction

          12.2  Nash and Subgame-Perfect Implementation

                 12.2.1  Nash Implementation: Maskin's Theorem

                 12.2.2  Subgame-Perfect Implementation

          12.3  The Holdup Problem

                  12.3.1  Specific Performance Contracts and Renegotiation

                           Design

                  12.3.2  Option Contracts and Contracting at Will

                  12.3.3  Direct Externalities

                  12.3.4  Complexity

          12.4  Ex Post Unverifiable Actions

                  12.4.1  Financial Contracting

                  12.4.2  Formal and Real Authority

          12.5  Ex Post Unverifiable Payoffs

                  12.5.1  The Spot-Contracting Mode

                  12.5.2  The Employment Relation and Efficient Authority

          12.6  Summary and Literature Notes

13     Markets and Contracts

          13.1  (Static) Adverse Selection: Market Breakdown and

                  Existence Problems

                  13.1.1  The Case of a Single Contract

                  13.1.2  The Case of Multiple Contracts

          13.2  Contracts as a Barrier to Entry

          13.3  Competition with Bilateral Nonexclusive Contracts in the

                  Presence of Externalities

                  13.3.1  The Simultaneous Offer Game

                  13.3.2  The Sequential Offer Game

                  13.3.3  The Bidding Game: Common Agency and Menu

                            Auctions

           13.4  Principal-Agent Pairs

          13.5  Competition as an Incentive Scheme

          13.6  Summary and Literature Notes

          APPENDIX

14     Exercises

         References

         Author Index

         Subject Index