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图书目录:Preface
Introduction 1.1 Optimal Employment Contracts without Uncertainty, Hidden Information, or Hidden Actions 1.2 Optimal Contracts under Uncertainty 11.2,1 Pure Insurance 1.2.2 Optimal Employment Contracts under Uncertainty 1.3 Information and Incentives 1.3.1 Adverse Selection 1,3.2 Moral Hazard 1.4 Optimal Contracting with Multilateral Asymmetric Information 1.4.1 Auctions and Trade under Multilateral Private Information 1.4.2 Moral Hazard in Teams, Tournaments, and Organizations 1.5 The Dynamics of Incentive Contracting 1.5.1 Dynamic Adverse Selection 1.5.2 Dynamic Moral Hazard 1.6 Incomplete Contracts 1.6.1 Ownership and Employment 1.6.2 Incomplete Contracts and Implementation Theory 1.6.3 Bilateral Contracts and Multilateral Exchange 1.7 Summing Up Part I STATIC BILATERAL CONTRACTING Hidden Information, Screening 2.1 The Simple Economics of Adverse Selection 2.1.1 First-Best Outcome: Perfect Price Discrimination 2.1.2 Adverse Selection, Linear Pricing, and Simple Two-Part Tariffs 2.1.3 Second-Best Outcome: Optimal Nonlinear Pricing 2.2 Applications 2.2.1 Credit Rationing 2.2.2 Optimal Income Taxation 2.2.3 Implicit Labor Contracts 2.2.4 Regulation 2.3 More Than Two Types 2.3.1 Finite Number of Types 2.3.2 Random Contracts 2.3.3 A Continuum of Types 2.4 Summary 2.5 Literature Notes 3 Hidden Information, Signaling 3.1 Spence's Model of Education as a Signal 3.1.1 Refinements 3.2 Applications 3.2.1 Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions under Asymmetric Information 3.2.2 Signaling Changes in Cash Flow through Dividend Payments 3.3 Summary and Literature Notes 4 Hidden Action, Moral Hazard 4.1 Two Performance Outcomes 4.1.1 First-Best versus Second-Best Contracts 4.1.2 The Second Best with Bilateral Risk Neutrality and Resource Constraints for the Agent 4.1.3 Simple Applications 4.1.4 Bilateral Risk Aversion 4.1.5 The Value of Information 4.2 Linear Contracts, Normally Distributed Performance, and Exponential Utility 4.3 The Suboptimality of Linear Contracts in the Classical Model 4.4 General Case: The First-Order Approach 4.4.1 Characterizing the Second Best 4.4.2 When is the First-Order Approach Valid? 4.5 Grossman and Hart's Approach to the Principal-Agent Problem 4.6 Applications 4.6.1 Managerial Incentive Schemes 4.6.2 The Optimality of Debt Financing under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability 4.7 Summary 4.8 Literature Notes Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information 5.1 Voluntary Disclosure of Verifiable Information 5.1.1 Private, Uncertifiable Information 5.1.2 Private, Certifiable Information 5.1.3 Too Much Disclosure 5.1.4 Unraveling and the Full Disclosure Theorem 5.1.5 Generalizing the Full Disclosure Theorem 5.2 Voluntary Nondisclosure and Mandatory-Disclosure Laws 5.2.1 Two Examples of No Disclosure or Partial Voluntary Disclosure 5.2.2 Incentives for Information Acquisition and the Role of Mandatory-Disclosure Laws 5.2.3 No Voluntary Disclosure When the Informed Party Can Be Either a Buyer or a Seller 5.3 Costly Disclosure and Debt Financing 5.4 Summary and Literature Notes Multidimensional Incentive Problems 6.1 Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Types 6.1.1 An Example Where Bundling Is Profitable 6.1.2 When Is Bundling Optimal? A Local Analysis 6.1.3 Optimal Bundling: A Global Analysis in the 2 x 2 Model 6.1.4 Global Analysis for the General Model 6.2 Moral Hazard with Multiple Tasks 6.2.1 Multiple Tasks and Effort Substitution 6.2.2 Conflicting Tasks and Advocacy 6.3 An Example Combining Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 6.3.1 Optimal Contract with Moral Hazard Only 6.3.2 Optimal Contract with Adverse Selection Only 6.3.3 Optimal Sales with Both Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 6.4 Summary and Literature Notes Part II STATIC MULTILATERAL CONTRACTING 7 Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Bilateral Trading 7.2.1 The Two-Type Case 7.2.2 Continuum of Types 7.3 Auctions with Perfectly Known Values 7.3.1 Optimal Efficient Auctions with Independent Values 7.3.2 Optimal Auctions with Independent Values 7.3.3 Standard Auctions with Independent Values 7.3.4 Optimal Independent-Value Auctions with a Continuum of Types: The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 7.3.5 Optimal Auctions with Correlated Values 7.3.6 The Role of Risk Aversion 7.3.7 The Role of Asymmetrically Distributed Valuations 7.4 Auctions with Imperfectly Known Common Values 7.4.1 The Winner's Curse 7.4.2 Standard Auctions with Imperfectly Known Common Values in the 2 x 2 Model 7.4.3 Optimal Auctions with Imperfectly Known Common Values 7.5 Summary 7.6 Literature Notes 7.7 Appendix: Breakdown of Revenue Equivalence in a 2 x 3 Example Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion 8.1 Moral Hazard in Teams and Tournaments 8.1.1 Unobservable Individual Outputs: The Need for a Budget Breaker 8.1.2 Unobservable Individual Outputs: Using Output Observations to Implement the First Best 8.1.3 Observable Individual Outputs 8.1.4 Tournaments 8.2 Cooperation or Competition among Agents 8.2.1 Incentives to Help in Multiagent Situations 8.2.2 Cooperation and Collusion among Agents 8.3 Supervision and Collusion 8.3.1 Collusion with Hard Information 8.3.2 Application: Auditing 8.4 Hierarchies 8.5 Summary 8.6 Literature Notes Part III REPEATED BILATERAL CONTRACTING Dynamic Adverse Selection 9.1 Dynamic Adverse Selection with Fixed Types 9.1.1 Coasian Dynamics 9.1.2 Insurance and Renegotiation 9.1.3 Soft Budget Constraints 9.1.4 Regulation 9.2 Repeated Adverse Selection: Changing Types 9.2.1 Banking and Liquidity Transformation 9.2.2 Optimal Contracting with Two Independent Shocks 9.2.3 Second-Best Risk Sharing between Infinitely Lived Agents 9.3 Summary and Literature Notes 10 Dynamic Moral Hazard 10.1 The Two-Period Problem 10.1.1 No Access to Credit 10.1.2 Monitored Savings 10.1.3 Free Savings and Asymmetric Information 10.2 The T-period Problem: Simple Contracts and the Gains from Enduring Relations 10.2.1 Repeated Output 10.2.2 Repeated Actions 10.2.3 Repeated Actions and Output 10.2.4 Infinitely Repeated Actions, Output, and Consumption 10.3 Moral Hazard and Renegotiation 10.3.1 Renegotiation When Effort Is Not Observed by the Principal 10.3.2 Renegotiation When Effort Is Observed by the Principal 10.4 Bilateral Relational Contracts 10.4.1 Moral Hazard 10.4.2 Adverse Selection 10.4.3 Extensions 10.5 Implicit Incentives and Career Concerns 10.5.1 The Single-Task Case 10.5.2 The Multitask Case 10.5.3 The Trade-Off between Talent Risk and Incentives under Career Concerns 10.6 Summary 10.7 Literature Notes Part IV INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 11 Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design 11.1 Introduction: Incomplete Contracts and the Employment Relation 11.1.1 The Employment Relation 11.1.2 A Theory of the Employment Relation Based on Ex Post Opportunism 11.2 Ownership and the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm 11.2.1 A General Framework with Complementary Investments 11.2.2 A Framework with Substitutable Investments 11.3 Financial Structure and Control 11.3.1 Wealth Constraints and Contingent Allocations of Control 11.3.2 Wealth Constraints and Optimal Debt Contracts when Entrepreneurs Can Divert Cash Flow 11.4 Summary 11.5 Literature Notes 12 Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Nash and Subgame-Perfect Implementation 12.2.1 Nash Implementation: Maskin's Theorem 12.2.2 Subgame-Perfect Implementation 12.3 The Holdup Problem 12.3.1 Specific Performance Contracts and Renegotiation Design 12.3.2 Option Contracts and Contracting at Will 12.3.3 Direct Externalities 12.3.4 Complexity 12.4 Ex Post Unverifiable Actions 12.4.1 Financial Contracting 12.4.2 Formal and Real Authority 12.5 Ex Post Unverifiable Payoffs 12.5.1 The Spot-Contracting Mode 12.5.2 The Employment Relation and Efficient Authority 12.6 Summary and Literature Notes 13 Markets and Contracts 13.1 (Static) Adverse Selection: Market Breakdown and Existence Problems 13.1.1 The Case of a Single Contract 13.1.2 The Case of Multiple Contracts 13.2 Contracts as a Barrier to Entry 13.3 Competition with Bilateral Nonexclusive Contracts in the Presence of Externalities 13.3.1 The Simultaneous Offer Game 13.3.2 The Sequential Offer Game 13.3.3 The Bidding Game: Common Agency and Menu Auctions 13.4 Principal-Agent Pairs 13.5 Competition as an Incentive Scheme 13.6 Summary and Literature Notes APPENDIX 14 Exercises References Author Index Subject Index |